⁃ Thematic discussion on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items (from 92 to 109)
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇳🇱 Kingdom of the Netherlands, 🇰🇷 Republic of Korea
Mr. Chairman, we believe it necessary to avail ourselves of our right of apply with regard to the disinformation of the uh of Ukraine about the situation around surrounding the Russian nuclear power plant and the adjoining areas. Uh the for us, uh th this issue has been closed. The residents of Zaporizhia have uh chosen to join the Russian Federation. And only this year alone there have been attacks on radioactive uh waste storage facilities in the machine energy block number six of the Zaporizhia plant. There's been shelling Of uh the reserve diesel generators of the st station. What is the height of cynicism are the statements of the representatives of Kiev about the fact that there is a lack of qualified personnel? And it was Ukraine that uh carried out a campaign to deliberately and systematically kill the staff of the station, including the one that died on the 15th of July of this year, the chief engineer of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, Aleksandr Yakovlev. We would also like to respond separately to the latest attempts of the representatives of South Korea to cast doubt on the legitimacy of Russia and the DPRK's cooperation. We're compelled to repeat that the UN Security Council has not limited the right of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under the under Charter Article 51. No statements about Article 103 can change the charter. We would recommend that Seoul think about uh the facts of the agreements in the Russian Korean uh agreement, but and they should analyze the actions that they're taking, what which are the root cause for the increase in escalations on the Korean peninsula. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman. I would like to respond to the latest spurious accusations. We heard them from a number of Western countries and they were against Russia. The accusations have to do with the so-called irresponsible nuclear rhetoric. These claims lack any genuine basis. They should be viewed as propaganda. They're motivated by a maniacal obsession to demonize our country. Official statements of the representatives of Russia on nuclear issues are fully aligned with the relevant international commitments, and they do not move beyond our national doctrines, which are purely defensive. We would recall that this the document that lays out the basis of Russia's state policy on nuclear determents clearly lays out the set of extreme circumstances in which we would allow for a nuclear response. Such an arsenal could be used only to repel aggression, that is, uh critical aggression. In terms of public rhetoric, we act in stringent alignment with these basic tenets. The state of affairs is such that we occasionally need to send to NATO countries serious warnings. This is due to their extremely aggressive rhetoric and highly escalatory actions, actions that create for us a direct and clear threat. It was precisely the classical logic of deterrence that prompted our signals about Russia's firm resolve to protect its core interests, security interests, through all available methods. In addition, we're compelled by the deplorable situation, the blame for which falls on NATO. NATO is bent on expansion. It is deeply hostile to us, and it has plunged relations with Russia to a very severe crisis. Moreover, they're carrying out heedless actions. In so doing, they're risking tipping this crisis into a head-on collision of nuclear powers, which is fraught with catastrophic uh dangers. The uh such a situation uh forces us to envision the worst case scenarios as fully realistic. The threats from NATO countries have continued to increase, including in the nuclear realm. The remilitarization of Europe includes the formation of cooperative schemes for the use of the arsenals of Great Britain and France in uh common. Uh and and and for common purposes involving non-nuclear allies. In addition to the advanced deterrence practiced by Paris, we're talking about the nuclear they're talking about the nuclear umbrella provided by London for the uh participants of the joint expeditionary force. At the same time, a number of non nuclear states of Europe are liberalizing their national laws and doctrines, clearing away obstacles to appearance of nuclear weapons on their territory. All of this is happening in addition to the capacities and the algorithms of NATO nuclear sharing missions, which are actively and comprehensively being developed. Uh there's also in Italy right now exercises underway rehearsing NATO states use of US nuclear weapons deployed in Europe, and they're absolutely not hiding the fact that these acts are against Russia. Thus the states of NATO are uh engaged in multi multiplying and destabilizing uh Nuclear uh deterrence of variable geometry which harms the NPT inter alia. This strengthens and ramps up the aggregate common NATO capacity which threatens Russia. This is coupled with escalatory rhetoric, brandishing of nuclear arsenals, and probing of ways to undermine our country's security and hatching provocative plans. That includes the further harmful expansion of NATO, an expansion which poses for us a serious strategic threat. What is this, if not irresponsible behavior? Given the foregoing, these countries aren't the ones to be the judge of irresponsible policy and rhetoric. Thank you.
Chair, in response to the Russian Federation accusation with regard to politicizing the OPCW, I would like to share some inconvenient facts also on behalf of Germany. With regard to the widespread use of riot control agents RCA in Ukraine, the Ukrainian authorities have documented more than 14,000 cases of the use of riot control agents since 2022. Please. Yeah, I give the floor for the uh for the Russian Federation on the point of order. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As far as we understand, right now we're in the cluster. On the right of reply in the context of the of cluster one on nuclear disarmament. And as we see it, the distinguished representative of the Netherlands is attempting to use his right of reply in the context of the second cluster, responding to a statement delivered by our country in the context of cluster two. And uh, as we've understood from your explanation, that's not the decision that we've just taken this morning. This segment For the right of reply is dedicated to cluster one nuclear weapons. In that regard, we would ask to put off the statement of our distinguished colleague from the Kingdom of the Netherlands until the segment of the right of reply on cluster two. And right now we should focus on the right of apply on cluster one nuclear weapons. Thank you. So may I uh suggest the the uh distinguished uh representative of the Kingdom of Netherlands and to defer the right of replies at the end of the second cluster because this is the first cluster we are discussing. If it is the related to the first cluster, you can continue. If it is not, you have to defer for the second one. Chair, as always we are as supportive as possible uh in your direction. Um I asked uh yesterday indeed the right of reply with regard to a statement made by the Russian Federation uh regarding uh other weapons of mass destruction. So I'm uh all in your hands to deliver this statement at a later moment. Thank you. So in this case, and it will be at the end of the day, and still we are discussing about that. So, on that, I would uh now uh call on the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Over the past two weeks, my delegation has addressed and firmly rejected the baseless allegations against Iran's peaceful nuclear program, both in our national statement and in several right of replies. I will not revisit those points and instead refer delegations to our previous interventions. However, I must point out that the representatives of the United Kingdom and certain other Western states continue to misuse every available platform, including Cluster One, dedicated to addressing nuclear weapons to advance politically motivated narratives against Iran. Rather than perpetuating these allegations, this cluster should serve as a forum for addressing the concerns repeatedly expressed by non-nuclear weapon states regarding the persistence failure of the UK and its allies to fulfill their obligations under Article 6 of the treaty. Regrettably, certain non nuclear weapon states have also chosen to use this opportunity to level baseless allegations against the NPT state party rather than focus on the urgent need to fulfill nuclear disarmament obligations. These same countries, who lecture others on non fluorifers, vouched silently as two nuclear weapon possessors launched a bombing campaign against Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities, targeting scientists and infrastructure under IAA oversight. If the UK and certain other states genuinely seek a path forward, they must abandon their policy of hypocrisy, discrimination, double standard, pressure, intimidation, and distortion. A sustainable solution is possible only through engagement based on Iran's inner rights under the NPT, not coercion. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Now I call on the representative of DPRK and for the RUR of the first cluster of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Mr. Chair, uh, for the floor. Uh my delegation was compelled to take the floor uh to respond to the uh absurd allegation of the ROK. Uh now uh the situation in the Korean peninsula, especially in the southern border, is very unstable. Uh the RK military are seriously threatening the safety of our service personnel by firing warning shots at them. With automatic rifles and large caliber machine guns under such unreasonable pretext that the personnel involved in fortifying the southern border crossed the borderline. Such provocations began in August alongside warning loudspeaker blaring. They committed 2,870 rounds of provocative loudspeaker warning and 201 warning short provocations from August the 1st to October the 17th. Such enemy provocations more openly perpetrated in the wake of the fabricated mine explosion force has gone beyond the red line. The reckless move of the ROK aimed at gaining the superior strengths, foretail the escalation of regional military tensions and consider the root cause, and adding a new element of instability to the security environment of regional countries. The ROK have initiated on the 19th of October the large scale field mobile war exercises, HOGU. To be conducted with the US forces in ROK from 19th October until October the 13th. The ROK did not conceal the aggressive and provocative nature of the HOGU by announcing that it would intensify cooperation and actual war simulation in the spheres of rounds, sea, and air, and conduct such field mobile drills as stimulated battles between units. In the light of recent warfare during the exercises. Recently, the ROK staged provocative military drills such as maritime infiltration drill and Sang Yung, all of which were aimed at mastering the war fighting capabilities and enact a special law to introduce nuclear submarines. The present situation in which the hostile forces get frantic in their military moves to infringe upon the security interests of the DPRK. And undermined regional strategic stability highlights the validity and justness of the DPRK's indispensable self-defensive efforts to deter them. Bolster deterrent is required to deal with ever escalating threats, and repeated provocations are bound to meet with such prompt reaction as bolstering of stronger capabilities. The DPRK is unshakable in its stand to control and manage the threat to its secure. Security sphere, given the immutable reality that the enemy state's ill-intended moves for military confrontation will never come to an end or diminish. Tit for tat principle based on strong power will be applied to cope with the muscle flexing of the enemy state. Thank you, Mr. Check.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. Uh the Republic of Korea wishes to respond to the entire, groundless allegations by the representative of the DPRK that the ROK is carrying out provocations along its so called southern border. The Republic of Korea has remained consistent and firm in its principal response to the DPRK's continued activities within the demilitarized zone. Which constitute a breach of the Armistice Agreement. The Republic of Korea's warning, broadcasts, and warning shots are legitimate and defensive measures aimed at preventing the DPRK's troops from crossing the military military demarcation line and expelling those who have crossed who have cursed it. We call upon the DPRK to cease its escalatory activities and return to dialogue. And the DPRK is consistently misrepresenting the cause of the situation. We reiterate that the ROK U.S. combined defense and deterrence posture is a response to the DPRK's ever-growing military threats. This posture constitutes a legitimate and defensive response to protect the lives and safety of our people and to contribute to regional peace and stability. Regarding the illegality of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, we will not reiterate our points as most delegations here are already well aware of this issue. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yeah. Distinguished delegates, the committee will continue its considerations of the cluster on other weapons of mass destruction. The committee will meet all day today. So delegations wishing to exercise their right of reply will be able to do so at the end of the day. I would like to inform delegation that they will have an opportunity. No, no, no. Before I open the floor, I would like to remind all delegations to respect the time limit for the statement during the thematic discussion.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.