⁃ Thematic discussion on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items (from 92 to 109)
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇺🇦 Ukraine, 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran, 🇬🇧 United Kingdom, 🇯🇵 Japan, 🇸🇪 Sweden
Thank you, mister Chairman. Uh first and foremost, we would like to repudiate the latest uh unsubstantiated allegations against us from the delegation of the Republic of Korea. They are entirely divorced from reality. Furthermore, we also wish to repudiate the baseless insinuations uh against the Russian Federation from Western states regarding the Budapest memorandum. Frankly speaking, the inadequate attempts by Western states to uh levy to to to have unsubstantiated baseless allegations against Russia have in recent years are really have uh reached staggering levels. In recent years, we have uh provided detailed repeated uh uh commentary about this, which uh shows uh the flimsiness of these fabrications and they show that the reality is such that there are serious uh concerns about the Budapest uh memorandums in implementation by uh Kiev and its uh Western patrons. For those in the West who are unable to uh to uh hear our ironclad argumentation, we would like to call upon you to uh listen and familiarize yourselves from uh with statements uh delivered by uh Russian representatives at International Forum, including the first uh committee and the texts that are published uh uh uh the relevant uh web resources are not hard to find. Wasting time on uh allegations about this uh obsolete subject is something which we no longer view as appropriate. Thank you.
Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Uh the delegation of Ukraine uh wanted to uh exercise the right of reply under cluster one. If uh it's uh already already closed, just uh question. Uh if not possible, then we would like to make uh statement uh later. So you yeah you can you can make this. Uh the right of reply to the statement by the Russian Federation uh made earlier. Just as Secretary just you know clarified to me that the the Ukraine has already pressed you know the when I was reading to the uh moving to the second cluster cluster on the weather weapons of mass destruction. So in that case I think you know it is better to to
Thank you, thank you, Mr. Chair, for clarifications. Thank you. We would like to exercise the right of reply to the statement made by the Russian Federation earlier in our proceedings. So just want uh we just want to uh reject Russia's claims that the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant is a Russian nuclear facility. Uh the ZNPP is and will remain an integral part of Ukraine's of Ukraine, under Ukraine's sovereignty and jurisdiction, and uh also Russia's shame referendums and the so called treaties signed in. September 2022, Ukraine considers as null and void. They have no legal effect whatsoever on the status of the Zaporizhia region of Ukraine. Also, as we mentioned before, the General Assembly has made this unequivocally clear in its resolutions that which reaffirmed Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity and rejecting Russia's attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories. Regarding military activities near the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, Russia tells the The IAA that the military personnel present at the ZNPP are there to protect the facility. At the same time, Ukrainian defense and intelligence authorities continue to document Russian military activity at and around the ZNPP and occupied Enerhodar, including the deployment of military equipment and infrastructure, and the launch and support of Russian UAV operations against Ukrainian controlled communities on the opposite bank of the Dnipro River. Ukraine has regularly provided relevant information to the IAA Secretariat because such activity directly affects the implementation of the IAA Director General's five concrete principles and the nuclear safety and security of the plant. The contradiction is increasingly difficult to conceal. Russia describes its military personnel as being present solely to protect a civilian nuclear facility, while Ukrainian forces document military operations being conducted from the area in which the facility that facility is located. The military logic behind Russia's continued occupation is therefore becoming clearer that the ZPP provides Russian forces with an exceptionally protected environment. Precisely because it is a nuclear power plant. Moscow knows that Ukraine must exercise extraordinary restraint around the facility and take into account not only an immediate military threat, but also the potentially catastrophic consequences of any action affecting nuclear safety. In other words, Russia is exploiting the special protection that a civilian nuclear facility should enjoy in order to provide protection for its. Own military activities. The development of joint warfare makes this issue even more important. Military use of a nuclear site today cannot be assessed solely by looking for tanks or artillery pieces. UAV launch positions, control antennas, communication equipment, and other relatively small infrastructure can directly support combat operations. The five concrete principles must therefore remain capable of addressing the realities of modern warfare. Equipment used to launch, guide, or support attack drones does not become compatible with the protection of a nuclear facility merely because it is smaller or less visible than. Traditional heavy weaponry. Also, I would like to remind that in February 2025, a Russian drone struck the new safe confinement over the destroyed Unit 4 of the Chernobyl MPP, seriously damaging a structure built through decades of international effort and enormous financial and technical contributions from many countries represented. Including in this meeting room. This was not merely damage to Ukrainian infrastructure, it was an attack on one of the most important international nuclear safety proje projects ever undertaken. On 7 June this year, Russia UAV also struck the centralized penned nuclear fuel storage facility near Chernobyl's buildings were damaged, including premises used by IA personnel. So I would like just uh Diane to underscore that um this uh nuclear safety uh threat will continue unless uh until the time that Russia re returned will leave the Z N PP and the nuclear object will return to Ukraine's full control. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation categorically rejects and strongly condemns the baseless and politically motivated accusations made by the representatives of the United States and the Israeli regime under Cluster II and what we just heard in the Israeli regime's right of reply. If there is any entity in our region that possesses both the capacity and the proven willingness to produce and use weapons of mass destruction, chemical, biological, and nuclear, it is none other than the Israeli regime, with the United States fully complicit in its atrocities through its unwavering political, military and financial support. This is the only regime in the region that illegally possesses all types of WMDs and remains outside all international instruments on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction. And the reason is clear. This is a regime that has even weaponized the most basic necessities of life, water and food. As tools of war and oppression. There is credible and documented evidence of the use of prohibited munitions, including white phosphorus and depleted uranium. Unifell itself has confirmed that its personnel were injured by such weapons in Lebanon and similar reports have emerged from Gaza. The repeated allegations against Iran are a calculated attempt by the Israeli regime. And the US to divert attention from the issues they would rather this committee not confront, namely the Israeli regime's crimes in Gaza, the West Bank, Iran, and across the region. No amount of politically motivated accusation can conceal these realities or relieve the Israeli regime of accountability. The United States is in no position to lecture others while obstructing decades of negotiations on a legally binding BWC compliance and verification protocol, maintaining its reservation to the nineteen twenty five Geneva Protocol, and evading scrutiny of its extensive overseas network of over 120 biological laboratories across more than 30 countries, thereby raising serious accountability concerns under the BWC. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Chair. The United Kingdom rejects in the strongest possible terms the baseless allegations made by the Russian Federation in its most recent statement. The claim that the United Kingdom possesses or employs chemical gas grenades is entirely false and without foundation. Russia's intervention was regrettably characteristic of its ongoing campaign of disinformation and distortion. Which seeks to undermine confidence in the Chemical Weapons Convention and to distract from its own violations. The UK remains a firm supporter of the CWC. Our commitment to the full and transparent implementation of its provisions is unwavering. We recall that the OPCW Technical Secretariat and independent investigations have repeatedly documented and attributed. Instance of instances of chemical weapons use by the Russian Federation in Salisbury, in Syria, and in Ukraine. Russia's attempts to invert this reality are an affront to the integrity of the Convention and to this committee. We also note Russia's cynical misuse of technical discussions within the OPCW to obfuscate clear obligations. There is no ambiguity in the Convention's prohibition on the use of riot control agents as a method of warfare. The UK calls on all states parties to reaffirm that prohibition, and to reject any effort to reinterpret or erode it. Finally, we urge all delegations not to be distracted by these fabrications, but to focus instead on restoring trust, accountability, and compliance within the CWC framework. Principles that Russia itself continues to undermine through its words and its actions. Mr President, I would also like to align myself with the comments of the distinguished Ambassador of the Netherlands on Russia's use of epibatidine against Alexander Navalny. Thank you.
Thank you Mr Chair. The as I stated, Japan remains fully committed to multilateral efforts for arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including the CWC. Japan has continued to expand its utmost efforts to make progress in the destruction of abandoned chemical weapons in China by investing in human and financial resources in line with the CWC. Also, as I stated, the ACW project is a joint project between Japan and China, and as Japan is proceeding with this project, it is sharing perceptions with the Chinese side on various issues, and appropriate and timely cooperation from the Chinese side is also necessary to advance the project as planned. Japan has also provided information that indicates the location of the ACWs to the extent possible. Also, to ensure the safety of people and the protection of the environment is the most important matter, and it is a top priority for Japan, and Japan's measures meet the requirement of the CWC and Chinese domestic laws and regulations in destroying chemical weapons. Also, as I already stated, Japan and China jointly submitted destruction plans through the discussion to seek a feasible plan. And in accordance with this destruction plan, Japan has been making the best possible efforts to complete the destruction with necessary cooperation by China. We will continue to make our utmost efforts based on the destruction plan beyond 2022. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Chair. We reject the attempt by the Russian Federation to dismiss serious concerns regarding their breach of the Chemical Weapons Convention by obscuring facts or trying to reallocate responsibility to others. The matter at hand is serious. It concerns compliance with international law and obligations freely undertaken by the Russian Federation under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The Russian Federation has an obligation to address legitimate concerns and to abide by the fundamental norm that the use of chemical weapons by anyone, anywhere, at any time, under any circumstance is unacceptable. Traces of the lethal toxin Apibatidine were confirmed in biological samples from Mr Alexei Navalny. Only Russia had the means, motive and opportunity to carry out this poisoning. Three OPCW technical assistance visits have confirmed the presence of the riot control agent CS in battlefield samples in Ukraine. Repeating alternative theories is not the same as providing proof. Obscuring facts does not absolve the Russian Federation from its obligation to answer legitimate questions. Attempts to create doubt does not invalidate evidence, I thank you.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.