Thematic discussion on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items (from 92 to 109)
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇺🇸 United States, 🇮🇱 Israel, 🇱🇹 Lithuania, 🇺🇦 Ukraine, European Union
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'd like to react to the unfounded statement by the delegation of the United States, the delegation of Finland, and other delegations regarding Russian peaceful space activity. Once again, we will repeat for those delegations that all Russian activity in space fully corresponds to international commitments and obligations of Russia, is uh purely uh peaceful in character and is not aimed at any states. This applies to the activity related to the Cosmos 2612 space uh uh uh equipment. If uh the US uh has any concerns about this activity, we have been uh suggesting for many years to deal with these concerns very simply by developing uh and adopting a legally binding instrument on preventing an arms race in space. Which would prohibit the placement of weapons in space and also would prohibit certain types of activity and would limit them. As for the attempts to distort the approaches uh of uh the Russian Federation to space activity, that supposedly they only applied to capabilities, that is not the case. We are suggesting uh bans and prohibitions both uh uh on specific capabilities and uh uh certain types of act activities. As for a statement in twenty twenty two, we would like to uh Appeal to the U.S. to support the relevant draft resolution submitted by the Russian Federation, which we're presenting in the fourth committee of the General Assembly, and which is aimed at prohib prohibiting the use of of uh uh civilian space uh satellites in uh uh for uh non uh civilian purposes. And in conclusion, I'd like to use the words of the United States itself, that the uh actions of the United States uh sound much louder than the words they speak here in the committee. And these activities should not mislead anyone. The transparency that the US uh demonstrates is aimed merely to promote an arms race and aimed at justifying the placement of weapons in space. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair. The United States notes the comments from the Russian delegation yesterday regarding the U.S. cooperative biological activities and wishes to exercise our right of reply in response to these repeated allegations, which were made at the last as the last comment before we moved on to a new cluster. Let me be clear. Russia's allegations against the United States in Ukraine. Excuse me, there is a point of order.
Thank you, mister Chairman. We would like to request uh clarification as we We thought that uh we had uh we had finished work on the second cluster yesterday. All statements under the right of reply were uh completed on that cluster today. We're not discussing we haven't discussed the second cluster. And at the end of today's meeting, as far as we understand it, our s segments on the right of reply uh applied to c a third cluster, space, and the fourth cluster, uh conventional weapons. The delegation of the United States had a chance to sp to exercise its right of reply yesterday. Today as we see it, uh statements on the second cluster uh contradict the procedure that we agreed and our methods of work. Thank you. Uh I would like to remind that it's uh at its organizational meeting, the committee decided that attendance to in exercise of rights of reply will take place at the end of each day. There were differing interpretation of this decision when more than one thematic cluster is considered at a given meeting. Yesterday, the Chair proceeded with taking all statements cluster by cluster at the end of the day. Today, once again, two thematic clusters are being considered. Delegations can exercise their rights of reply at the end of the day, but the chair has first allowed rights of reply on the first cluster, which was concluded earlier today. The committee is now listening to rights of reply at the end of the day. I hope this clarifies the situation. Russian Federation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We completely uh agree with your explanations and fully ready to follow those explanations, but uh based on these explanations today at the end of this meeting. We have an opportunity of making statements under right of reply on the clusters that we have been discussing today, just as we did yesterday. Today we discussed cluster three, space, and cluster four conventional weapons. We did not discuss cluster uh two, other uh types of weapons of mass destruction. This is why we believe that it is not quite uh uh consistent with this with the explanations you have m uh offered us and the decisions that have made not quite consistent to give the p the U.S. the possibility of uh a right of reply on the second cluster. Of course they can uh uh on on cluster three and four of course, but on we c we completed our discussion of cluster two yesterday. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair. Let me be clear. Russia's allegations against the United States and Ukraine are false. As we stated yesterday, the United States is in full compliance with its obligations under the BWC. It does not develop or possess biological or toxin weapons anywhere. All of our biological activities are for purposes fully consistent with our obligations under the BWC. This includes the cooperation and assistance activities that Russia and others seek to malign. In addition, the United States has been extraordinarily transparent about the history of our program and its elimination. In December, we held a side event on the margins of the BWC where we shared extensive detail on the processes to destroy our biological weapon stockpiles and convert U.S. facilities to peaceful purposes in the 1970s, processes in which we invested millions of dollars. Notably, there has not been an equal degree of transparency from the Russian Federation about its own history with biological weapons. Russia claims that we have provided no responses to its questions. In fact, We have answered those questions over and over in a written response provided detailed information on U.S. cooperation and assistance activities in Ukraine and elsewhere, which was shared both with Russia and with the other BWC states' parties, and in statements and technical briefings at the 2022 Article V formal consultative meeting. It is clear that Moscow is not interested in hearing our responses to its questions. nor in engaging in good faith. But the fact is that the United States has been open and transparent about our past offensive program and its elimination, as well as the nature and details of our cooperative overseas activities. The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the Russian Federation. Thank you, Chair.
Mr. Chairman, we'd like to react to the statement uh of the European Union, which has tried to distort the situation on the uh anti personnel conven ban convention. Now um the uh S withdrawal of uh neighboring countries of uh r of Russia from that convention is uh example of their cavalier attitude to international legal c commitments, uh readiness to reject any uh those that are inconvenient whenever they feel it necessary. Uh attempts by these states to motivate these uh steps by so-called national security or uh or so-called ostensible threat from Russia uh hold do not hold water. The withdrawal from the convention is uh accompanied by a significant increase by these countries of military activities on their eastern borders directly next to Russian borders, as well as plans to establish uh legal production of uh earlier uh uh banned munitions uh for the needs of the Ukraine armed forces, which clearly does not contribute to easing uh tensions that these states keep talking about. On a separate point, we'd like to just mention the obligations of Ukraine under the convention and its inconsistent steps with regard to this document. The continued use by the Ukrainian armed forces of antipersonnel mines is a violation of the convention on banning antipersonnel mines. And the Ukraine continues to be a party to that uh convention in spite of its notification of suspension of the document. In accordance with the Article 65 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, such a suspension can only take into effect if no objections have been raised by parties within three months. At the same time, based on information we have, uh such uh objections were submitted to the Secretary-General of the UN by certain members member states of the anti-personnel mine convention soon after the notification by Ukraine. At the same time, obligations under the Anti Mine Convention were not fulfilled by Kiev even before this notification. According to the requirements of the Convention. Uh Ukraine was supposed to back in twenty ten destroyed stockpiles of all its antipersonnel mines except a minimal amount required for developing methods of identifying means and training uh specialists. However, it uh did not do so. Uh the use by the Kiev regime of antipersonnel mines against civilians is regularly identified by the Russian security forces. At the same time, the these uh violations of the convention did not uh uh lead to a response from its uh uh member states. The situation around the convention uh simply confirms Russian uh assessments regarding the weakness of this uh treaty. The convention does not uh have the necessary leverage on countries which uh one way or another avoid fulfilling its obligations. Unlike the aforementioned countries, the Russian Federation continues to fulfill its obligations in good faith under Protocol 2 and Protocol 5 on the Convention on Inhumane Weapons. With regard to the use of mines, from the very beginning of the special military operation, the Russian Armed Forces are acting in accordance with a manual on international humanitarian law for the armed forces of Russia. In this document, Inter alia, uh uh it identifies the main requirements on the use of antipersonnel mines in accordance with uh uh Protocol II on the con of the Convention on Inhumane Weapons. The results of our national efforts to prevent the mine threat are regularly reflected in Russian reports under the Convention on Inhumane Weapons and its additional Protocol two and Protocol five. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, we would request that you strictly uh follow the methods of work that we have agreed on and the Russian Federation will oppose the violation of these methods of work by any delegation, no matter who which delegation undertakes these steps. We will not accept rights of reply on just on any clusters at the end of the day. We only discuss items that we discussed during this specific meeting or during that day. Thank you.
Requesting the right of life.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. In the response of uh the right of reply made just by the Russian Federation, my country would like to emphasize that Russian Federation is not in opposition to lecture on the withdrawals from the Convention itself is not a party to. We have witnessed Russia's deliberate target again of civilians, Russia's extensive and indiscriminate use of cluster munitions and mines in Ukraine, and Russia's complete disregard for international humanitarian law. Russia is not a party to the Ottawa and Oslo conventions. Lithuania's decision on the Ottawa and Oslo conventions were not made lightly nor in isolation. These decisions followed broad consultations domestically and with partners and were taken in full transparency and in full accordance with the provisions of the conventions. We continue to value the humanitarian character on the of the conventions and recognize their important role. in protecting civ civilians worldwide, not as Russia. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our delegation would like to exercise its right of reply to the statement made. Made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. Russia, which is not a party state party to the Ottawa Convention, has extensively used antipersonal mines throughout this war of aggression against Ukraine, has neither the legal nor the moral authority to lecture about Ukraine's obligations under the Ottawa Convention. We would like to remind that in 2005, Ukraine ratified the Ottawa Convention. And since then has faithfully fulfilled its obligations. At the same time, the Russian Federation launched an armed aggression against Ukraine since 2014, has extensively used anti-personal mines as a method of warfare. Since 2022, when Russia began its full scale invasion of Ukraine, its mass use of such means has created an asymmetric advantage for the aggressor. We emphasize that at the time of Ukraine's signing and ratification of the Ottawa Convention, such circumstances did not exist and could not have been foreseen. As a result, Ukraine has found itself in an equal and unjust situation that restricts its right to self-defense, as enshrined in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Ukraine is not alone in facing the difficult choice between fulfilling its obligations under the Ottawa Convention and ensuring the effective defense of its homeland from a ruthless aggressor that disregards all norms of international law. Ukraine believes that in a international community must understand that the regional security situation has significantly Country deteriorated since Ukraine joined the Ottawa Convention. In this regard, in order to protect our country from Russian uh atrocities, Ukraine has made a difficult but necessary political decision to stop the implementation of certain obligations under the Ottawa Convention. In the context of Russia's ongoing genocide aimed at destroying Ukraine as a state and Ukrainians as a nation, Ukraine is compelled to give unconditional priority to the security of its citizens and the defense of our state. This applies in particularly to our state's participation in international legal instruments and mechanisms. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair. In response to Russia's right of reply. Uh the widespread contamination of Ukraine's territory with uh antipersonal mines, other mines, unexploded ordnance and other explosive remnants of war as a result of Russia's war of aggression continues to kill and injure civilians, including children, obstructs access to agricultural land and essential services, and will have severe long term humanitarian and socio economic consequences. Russia must fully comply with international humanitarian law. Including the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution. Those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law must be held accountable. The EU will continue to support efforts to survey, mark, clear, and safely dispose of mines, unexploded ordnance, and explosive remnants of war in Ukraine, as well as risk education, victim assistance, and broad recovery efforts. Humanitarian demining is essential to protect civilians. restore livelihoods and enable the safe return of displaced persons. The EU also underlines the importance of international cooperation and assistance in addressing the long-term impact of explosive hazards in Ukraine. Thank you, Chair.
Mr. Chairman, we'd like to react very briefly to the spurious uh accusations against the Russian Federation by a number of uh delegations who just spoke. I would like to assure all delegation all these delegations that the special military operation is being conducted by the Russian Federation in full compliance with its international obligations, and in my previous statement under the right of reply, we provided the necessary arguments uh uh to back that up. As for the special military operation itself, I would like to assure these delegations that in f in full compliance with international law, the goals of the special military operations uh will be fully met. Thank you.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.