Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency - Item 91: Note by the Secretary-General (A/81/325) and draft resolution (A/81/L.7) Debate on the item and action on the draft resolution
Debate on the item and action on the draft resolution
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇰🇵 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 🇦🇺 Australia, 🇧🇾 Belarus, 🇺🇦 Ukraine, 🇮🇱 Israel, 🇨🇳 China, 🇱🇹 Lithuania, 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran
Madam President, um, we note with regret that a number of delegations today decided to impede the deliberations of the General Assembly by trying to politicize the discussion by mentioning extraneous topics that have nothing to do with the issue on the agenda. Russia is categorically opposed to this approach. We see no point in reacting to yet another provocative stories about alleged unprovoked aggression against Ukraine. We have repeatedly explained our position on this matter. Now, in connection with the comments made by some delegations regarding the Zaporozhia NPP, we would like to note the following. According to the results of the referendum held in the Zaporozhia region, held in full compliance with international standards, and this was confirmed by independent observers. This region became part of the Russian Federation Federation. Accordingly, the ZNPP is now under Russian jurisdiction, and an organization has been created that will operate the plant. Units of the Russian uh guard continue to protect the Zaporozhye NPP because such an important facility as a nuclear power plant cannot remain unguarded for a minute. At the same time, the main threat to the safety of the NPP remains a Kiev regime demonstrating its terrorist nature. continues reckless attacks on the plant, and creates serious risks to nuclear um um security and safety at it, including the possibility of a large scale accident with radiation emissions. Western countries are well aware of where the Z N P P is actually being shelled from, The territory of Ukraine can be seen through and through by Western satellite surveillance systems. Nonetheless, our Western colleagues continue to cover up for the Kiev regime, thereby encouraging very dangerous actions. For our part, we continue doing everything in our power to ensure nuclear safety and security at the Zaporozhye NPP. I thank you.
Thank you, Madam President. The DPRK delegation wishes to exercise its right of reply in response to the provocative and politically motivated remarks made by certain delegations. Which blatantly denied a DPRK's sovereign and legitimate right during the general debate. The DPRK once again categorically rejects, in the strongest possible terms, those groundless and illogical allegations. Let us be clear. First, the DPRK has enshrined the position of nuclear weapons in its national law, reflecting the unanimous will of all the Korean people. And continues to fulfill its obligations under the law. Those who argue so-called CVID must recognize that their demands openly disregard and violate the sovereignty of the DPRK. Second, the DPRK's nuclear deterrent serves as a reliable guarantee for safeguarding the sovereignty of the state, regional stability, and world peace against the hegemonic and hostile forces. Those who portray the DPRK's nuclear deterrent as a threat. Merely demonstrate their own hostility toward our state and the region as well as their hegemonic ambitions. Third, the DPRK withdrew from the NPD a long time ago and is not a member of the IAEA. Therefore, it is illegitimate to dictate a position of our state or criticize its efforts to strengthen its defense capabilities. The DPRK's status as a nuclear weapon state does not require recognition by Western countries or the IAEA. It is backed by its actual nuclear deterrent and has been irreversibly and permanently enshrined in the supreme law of the state. Fourth, the integrity and legitimacy of the MPD are not undermined by the exercise of the rights of the sovereign state outside the treaty. Rather, they are eroded from within the certain state parties that arbitrarily distort the nature and the scope of the treaty's application. Those who are arguing over the CVID should focus on the countries that are neglecting their nuclear disarmament obligations under the NPT and engaging in proliferation related activities, such as extending nuclear deterrence and transferring nuclear submarine technology to non nuclear weapon states. We want to address the fact that the representative of the Franks referred to our country by an incorrect name. Calling the official lame of a sovereign state is one of the most elementary principles at this chamber. If the French representative made this mistake intentionally, it demonstrates ignorance. However, if the reference was deliberate, it can be regarded as another grave. Provocation against sovereign state. The DPRK is firm and unshakable in its determination to control and counter with the nuke on the principle of ensuring security and defending peace by dint of the powerful strength the nuclear threat by the enemy countries aimed to encroach upon its absolute and inviolable sovereignty and security. Thank you, Madam.
Thank you, President. I take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to address some misleading assertions which have been made in the preceding debate regarding AUKUS cooperation. President, Australia's Naval Nuclear Propulsion Programme is proceeding in full compliance with AUKUS partners' respective international obligations, including under the NPT, Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and Additional Protocol. We remain committed to setting the highest possible non-proliferation standard and to transparency with the international community. Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT and remains aligned with the treaty. As the Director General of the IAEA has repeatedly made clear, Article 14 of the IAEA's Model CSA is the specific provision to support the right of states to use nuclear material in a non prescribed military activity. Including for naval nuclear propulsion. Australia is continuing its engagement with the IAEA to develop a safeguards and verification approach for its naval nuclear propulsion programme within the framework of Australia's CSA and Additional Protocol, including an Article 14 arrangement. As we have made clear, Australia's Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. Australia's conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures, enabling the agency to continue to fulfill its technical safeguards objectives for Australia at all times. We recognize that there are genuine questions amongst member states regarding naval nuclear propulsion programs in states maintaining a CSA. We remain committed to transparency and we continue to engage openly. As in previous years, Australia has delivered an update to this year's General Conference in Vienna on our program to acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines. AUKUS partners have also provided updates at every regular meeting of the Board of Governors since the AUKUS partnership was first announced. The Director General has made it clear that he will continue to keep Member States informed on developments in his engagement on naval nuclear propulsion programs. As the Director General last report on Australia's program confirms, Australia continues to provide the agency with all information required under its safeguards agreements, and the agency continues to conduct verification activities in relation to Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program. President, we regret efforts by some to cast doubt on the agency's clear authority to negotiate directly and in confidence with member states on safeguards and verification arrangements, including for naval nuclear propulsion under the CSA. As confirmed by the Director General's clear statements on this topic, the Agency's engagement with Australia in this regard is entirely within its mandate under its statute and safeguards agreements approved by the Board of Governors. It is important that Member States continue to reject all attempts to undermine and politicise the IAEA's independent technical mandate on which we all rely. Thank you.
Thank you, Madam President. First of all, we would like to note that for discussions of issues of nuclear safety, there are specialized international forums. However, Belarus has been forced to exercise its right of reply. In response to the criticism voiced in this room regarding the construction and operation of the Belarusian nuclear power plant, we wish to state that from the very beginning of the implementation of the National Nuclear Energy Programme, Belarus has transparently and responsibly and in cooperation with the IAEA and other foreign partners taken all necessary measures to ensure the safety of the nuclear power plant. There is ample evidence confirming the far fetched and unfounded nature of any allegations that the Belarus NPP is supposedly unsafe. Belarus is a party to all international conventions concluded under the auspices of the IAEA and participates on a continuous basis in the review procedures. We have received all recommended IAEA review and advisory missions. And on a voluntary basis, Belarus has conducted stress tests of the Belarus NPP in accordance with the methodology adopted by the EU, as well as peer review of the results by experts from EU member states. We share Lithuania's view that nuclear safety belongs to no one nation. It has no nationality. We are convinced that the importance of ensuring nuclear safety cannot depend on which state owns a nuclear facility. For that reason, we would recall that issues of nuclear safety should be considered on the basis of professional assessments, facts, and international standards. Regrettably, instead of a substantive expert dialogue, we continue to hear unilateral statements and accusations. We believe that this approach is unproductive. Specific technical issues should be discussed within the framework of the relevant international mechanisms, with the provision of well substantiated information and an opportunity to examine it professionally. We confirm that, taking into account forecasted socioeconomic development and the growth in electricity consumption, a decision has been taken to further develop nuclear energy generation in Belarus. Once this decision has been formally documented, we will notify interested parties in the established manner. We are open to constructive and professional cooperation with all interested states and relevant organizations on issues related to the safe and sustainable operation of the Belarus NPP. We call on parties not to politicize issues of nuclear safety and to make use of existing international forums for a substantive discussion of any well founded concerns. Thank you for your attention.
Madam President, the delegation of Ukraine is compelled to exercise the right of reply to the statement made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. Ukraine categorically rejects the misleading and unfounded allegations made by the Russian Federation. In his statement today, the Russian representative described the latest resolution entitled Nuclear Safety and Nuclear Security and Safeguards in Ukraine, adopted at the 70th session of the General Conference, as politically and legally null and void. Let us be absolutely clear. If there is anything that is truly null and void, both politically and legally, it is Russia's Sham referendums and also subsequent acts aimed at formalizing its attempted illegal annexation of Ukrainian territories. These illegal acts have no validity under international law and cannot alter Ukraine's internationally recognized borders. The General Assembly made this unequivocally clear in its resolution ES 11 4 adopted with the support of 143 member states. The Zaporizhia nuclear power plant is and will remain a Ukrainian nuclear facility. No amount of Russian propaganda, fabricated legal arguments or attempts to impose Russian jurisdiction can change this fact. Madam President, Russia continues to accuse Ukraine of military activities, drone operations, and shelling in the vicinity of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant and the occupied city of Narhadar. These accusations are yet another attempt to reverse the roles of aggressor and victim and divert international attention from Russia's illegal occupation and militarization of Ukrainian. Nuclear facility. It was Russia that brought military forces, weapons, and equipment on the premises of Europe's largest nuclear power plant. It is Russia's continued military presence and activities in and around the facility that create unacceptable risks to nuclear safety and security. Ukraine has repeatedly drawn attention to the use of the occupied plant and its surrounding areas by Russian forces for military purposes, including drone operations against Ukrainian controlled territory. Russia cannot occupy a nuclear power plant, use its premises for military purposes, endanger its personnel, and then lecture others about nuclear safety. The most effective and lasting way to eliminate this risk is clear. Russia must withdraw its military personnel and equipment for the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, return the facility to the full control of its legitimate Ukrainian authorities, and seize its war of aggression against Ukraine. Thank you, Madam President.
President, Madam President, I am compelled to respond to the remarks made by the representative of Iran. It is remarkable to hear a regime that has spent decades deceiving the international community lectures others about international law. Iran cannot violate its commitments, obstruct verification, and then present itself as the victim. The IEA Board of Governors has repeatedly found Iran in uncompliance with its safeguard. Obligations and in September decided to report this noncompliance to the Security Council. The facts are well documented. Over nine tons of nuclear material, including 440 kilograms of highly enriched uranium, have been outside agency safeguards for more than a year. Iran has provided no information on its status and no access to the facilities. It has stockpiled 60% enriched uranium. Which has no civilian justification. Iran's safeguards obligations are legally binding. They are not optional and they are not subject to Iranian conditions. The same applies to the Security Council resolutions reinstated in September 2025. A country with peaceful intentions does not conceal nuclear material from inspectors and does not use negotiations only to buy time. Madam President, Israel acted to remove an existential. an imminent threat in accordance with international law and will continue to do whatever is necessary to defend itself. A nuclear Iran is a danger to the entire world, and no amount of Iranian rhetoric will change the facts. I thank you.
Thank you, Madam President. The Chinese delegation was not planning to take the flow again. However, we feel compelled to respond to the statement by the representative of Australia in defense of AUKUS Nuclear Submarine Corporation. The AUKUS will transfer metric tons of weapon grade highly enriched uranium, which goes beyond the scope of the NPT and will cross the threshold of nuclear proliferation. Posing a serious challenge to the international nuclear non-proliferation regime as well as to international and regional strategic security and stability. Invoking or applying Article 14 of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement to AUKUS would inevitably break with existing practices under the IEA safeguards system set a significant precedent and have far reaching implications. An issue that is so highly contentious within the framework of the NPT and the IEA. Must be discussed and resolved by member states through an intergovernmental process characterized by equality, rationality, inclusiveness, mutual respect, and responsibility. In the last five years, to maintain international original peace, security, and stability, and to defend NPT and the effectiveness of IEA safeguard system, China has worked hard to advance the relevant intergovernment discussion process within IEA. Discussion among parties has gone deeper and deeper. With more and more diverse input, China stands ready to continue working with parties to jointly advance intergovernmental discussion on all aspects of AUKUS cooperation. China also urges relevant countries to stop rejecting intergovernmental discussion process and instead should heed and highly value different input of countries. We also hope that IEA will continue to provide necessary assistance to make contribution to defend NPT and the future development universality of IEA safeguard system. I thank you.
Thank you, Madam President. Um Lithuania takes the floor to exercise its right of reply to the statement made by Belarus. First, nuclear safety and the effective application of IAEA standards and review mechanisms are directly related to our discussion of the agency's annual report. Lithuania has no intention of replacing technical dialogue with political rhetoric. Indeed, a month ago, on 22nd of September 2026, our nuclear safety regulator sent another detailed communication to its Belarusian counterpart, reiterating that site selection and assessment remain a principal nuclear safety issue, and drawing attention once again to two unresolved concerns. First, evaluation of density and distribution of Lithuanian population was not done. And corresponding IAA safety standards were not taken into consideration during the site selection and assessment for Belarusian NPP. And second, Belarus has not invited AIA seed mission with modules covering review of Belarusian NPP site selection and evaluation, including environmental impact assessment. Further, we fully respect the professional work of IAEA. However, Belarus cannot present the conclusions of missions with defined scopes as comprehensive certification of the plant's safety. The IAA's 2017 seed mission examined specific external hazards and designed parameters. It did not constitute a comprehensive review of the initial site selection process or of cross broader population considerations raised by Lithuania. The report itself is explicit that the agency's findings do not replace a comprehensive safety assessment. Which remains a national responsibility. Finally, concerns regarding transboundary environmental procedures are not merely bilateral assertions. The meeting of the parties to the ESPO convention has found that Belarus in non compliant has found Belarus in non compliance in relation to the AustroWest project. As regards the proposed radioactive waste facilities, Lithuania has identified substantial deficiencies in the environmental impact assessment. Including the examination of alternatives, potential transboundary impacts, and accident scenarios. We do not question the agency's expertise. We question the suggestion that participation in review mechanisms is enough to resolve safety issues that remain unanswered. We call on Belarus to provide verifiable information and address the concerns on their merits, rather than dismissing them as political. Madam President, and with regard to the statement just made by the Russian Federation, I feel compelled to reiterate what Lithuania has already stated. No sovereign rights can arise from aggression or attempted annexation. I thank you.
My delegation categorically rejects and condemns baseless and absurd allegations by the representative of the Israeli regime against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. The Israeli regime is the last entity on earth entitled to lecture Iran or anyone else. A regime responsible for the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians in Gaza has no moral authority to lecture others. A regime that has carried out unlawful attacks against Iran, including its peaceful nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards, has no credibility to lecture Iran on nuclear non-proliferation. As the only entity in the Middle East that has not acceded to the NPT, the Israeli regime is in no position to lecture Iran, a state party to the treaties since 1970, on compliance with or implementation of the NPT and safeguard obligations. And a regime that continues to obstruct the establishment of the Middle East free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction cannot lecture Iran, which initiated this historic proposal in 1974. The Israeli regime, which has gone so far to weaponize even food and water against innocent civilians, has over the past eight decades carried out more than 3,000 terrorist operations, displaced over 7 million Palestinians, martyred and wounded hundreds of thousands. and imprison more than one million Palestinians, the Israeli regime, burdened by such a dark record, lacks any credibility to lecture other states on international law. Next time, before pursuing to lecture others, they are urged to look in the mirror and reflect on the atrocities for which their own regime must be held accountable. Madam President, my delegation also categorically rejects and condemns the baseless and deceptive allegations made by representatives of certain Western countries, including the UK, France, Australia, and the EU. Regarding Iran's nuclear program, I must state the following with absolute clarity. Iran's nuclear program has always been, is, and will remain exclusively peaceful. This is not a matter of debate, it is a matter of fact, record, and verification. Those who present pretended otherwise are deliberately spreading deception for political gain. These same countries who lecture others on non-proliferation watch silently as two nuclear weapon possessors launch a bombing campaign against Iran's safeguard nuclear facilities, targeting scientists and infrastructure under the IAA oversight. To those certain Western countries, I have a clear message. Before pointing fingers at Iran, address your own violations of Article 1, 2, and 6 of the NPT. Arising from your reliance on NATO's nuclear deterrence arrangements. Your selective invocation of international law, belatent hypocrisy, and double standards expose the hollowness of your accusations. Those who apply international law selectively have no credibility to lecture others on compliance. You cannot invoke international law against others while shielding yourselves and your allies from its obligations. I thank you, Madam President.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.