Thematic discussion on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items (from 92 to 109) A/C.1/81/L.1, A/C.1/81/L.2, A/C.1/81/L.3, A/C.1/81/L.4, A/C.1/81/L.7, A/C.1/81/L.10, A/C.1/81/L.11, A/C.1/81/L.12, A/C.1/81/L.13, A/C.1/81/L.14, A/C.1/81/L.17, A/C.1/81/L.30, A/C.1/81/L.31, A/C.1/81/L.34, A/C.1/81/L.36, A/C.1/81/L.38, A/C.1/81/L.40 A/C.1/81/L.41, A/C.1/81/L.44, A/C.1/81/L.46, A/C.1/81/L.49, A/C.1/81/L.51, A/C.1/81/L.52, A/C.1/81/L.54, A/C.1/81/L.55, A/C.1/81/L.57, A/C.1/81/L.58, A/C.1/81/L.59, A/C.1/81/L.64, A/C.1/81/L.65, A/C.1/81/L.68, A/C.1/81/L.70
🇺🇦 Ukraine, 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran, 🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇮🇱 Israel, 🇫🇮 Finland, 🇸🇪 Sweden, 🇰🇷 Republic of Korea, 🇰🇵 Democratic People's Republic of Korea
Mr. Chair, Ukraine is compelled to exercise its right of reply in response to the accus accusations made by the delegation of the Russian Federation. There is a striking contradiction between the accusations voiced by Russia today and its own conduct in cyberspace. Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine is not confined to the conventional battlefield. Cyberspace has become another domain in which Russia seeks to undermine Ukraine's sovereignty, weaken its defense capabilities, and inflict maximum damage on its civilian population. For years, Russia has conducted malicious cyber activities targeting Ukrainian government institutions, energy infrastructure, communications networks, financial systems, and essential civilian services. Let us recall the cyberattack against Ukraine's power grid in twenty fifteen, which caused widespread electricity outages and a devastating Notpetya attack in twenty seventeen, which spread far beyond Ukraine and caused enormous economic damage worldwide. Since the beginning of its full scale invasion, Russia has increasingly combined missile and drone. Strikes with militia cyber operations against Ukraine's critical infrastructure. In the first half of 2026 alone, Ukraine's computer emergency response team, CERT UA, handled more than 3,100 cyber incidents with local authorities, government institutions, the security and defense sector, and energy infrastructure among the principal targets. These figures illustrate the scale of the cyber threats Ukraine continues to face. Russia's militia cyber operations are an integral part of its war of aggression. Conducted alongside missile and constant missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian cities and critical infrastructure. Mr. Chair, despite this sustained pressure, Ukraine has demonstrated remarkable cyber resilience thanks to the professionalism of its institutions and the strong support of international partners. We are particularly grateful to the members of the Tallinn Mechanism, which have committed more than 300 million euros in civilian cybersecurity assistance to Ukraine since its establishment in December 2023. Established in response to Russia's persistent cyber threats, the Tallinn mechanism provides a coordinated international framework for strengthening Ukraine's civilian cybersecurity capabilities and long term resilience. It helps mobilize technical expertise, financial resources, and practical assistance to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen national cybersecurity institutions and enhance Ukraine's capacity to prevent, detect, respond to, and recover from malicious cyber operations. The very existence of this initiative demonstrates that Russia's malicious cyber activists are not an isolated concern, but a persistent challenge requiring sustained and coordinated action. Thank you. Now I call on
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation is compelled to talk to take the floor in exercise of its right of reply in response to the unfounded and absurd allegations made by the representative of the Israeli regime. We categorically reject this baseless and politically motivated accusation. Instead of engaging in unfounded allegations against others, these delegations should reflect on their own conduct, which is well documented and known to the international community. There is a profound contradiction in hearing accusations concerning attacks on civilian and civilian infrastructure from the representatives of a regime whose own conduct has resulted in extensive civilian casualties and the destruction of civilian infrastructure in our region. Such statements attempt to invert reality by casting the aggressor as the victim. The international community is well aware of the facts and cannot be misled by such narratives. Iran has long been one of the primary targets and victims of malicious cyber activities directed against its critical infrastructure, particularly by the Israeli regime. The Stoxnet attack against Iran's peaceful nuclear facilities, together with cyber attacks targeting the country's steel and petrochemical industries, fuel distribution system, gas stations, and municipal public services are only a few examples of such malicious activities. The US and Israeli regime's unlawful attacks in 2025 and 2026 against Iran have not been confined to kinetic operations. They have also involved extensive malicious cyber activities directed against Iran's critical infrastructure and civilian services, disrupting the daily lives of our people and the functioning of essential public services and businesses. The Israeli regime, which has gone so far as to weaponize even food and water against innocent civilians, has over the past eight decades carried out more than 3,000 terrorist operations, displaced over 7 million Palestinians, martyred and wounded hundreds of thousands, and imprisoned more than one million Palestinians. This is the very same regime that has launched military aggression against its neighbors, remains a party to none of the international instrument on disarmament and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and maintains hundreds of nuclear warheads in its arsenal. The Israeli regime, burdened by such a dark reca record, lacks any credibility to lecture other estates and express sympathy with Iranian people. I thank you, Mr Chekh. Now I call on delegations requested for the rights of reply at the end of the day today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm going to be brief. So as not to tire out the distinguished delegate of the of Chechia, I'm not going to repeat all the arguments that we repeatedly have voiced in this whole as regards our implementation of our international uh international law and uh IHL as well. All of you can see them in the materials of the sessions of the first committee. I just want to supplement my statement by adding one thing. At a time when all states of the world are in lack step in the resolve to strengthen the international uh IT security and to work toward the effective implementation of the tasks of the global mechanism that we've created. The state of Ukraine, the Zelensky regime, is the only country in the world that is not only not hiding, but even openly acknowledging and even boasting about the fact that it is carrying out hacks of uh purely civilian IT infrastructure in violation of norms of international law and the rules of responsible behavior of states in cyberspace, which was adopted by the General Assembly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The representative of the United States is asking for the floor and the other disarmament measures. Thank you, Chair. I take the floor to respond to Iran regarding their joint statement on the topic of attacks on nuclear facilities. Colleagues, the Iranian led joint statement you've heard during this session is full of dubious content. In particular, the joint statement distorts international law and selectively quotes the IAEA statute, the NPT, and other documents adopted by the IAEA General Conference and United Nations, taking them out of context and drawing inaccurate conclusions. For example, there is no provision in the IAEA statute that prohibits attacks on nuclear facilities or addresses such attacks in any fashion. It is also inaccurate that there is a per se prohibition on attacks on nuclear facilities under international law, including international humanitarian law. Instead of pursuing this joint statement, Iran should be focused on fully cooperating with the IAEA, which it is obliged to do under its NPT related safeguards agreement, and as the international community has called on Iran to do for over five years. Helping to assure the international community that its nuclear program is indeed peaceful in nature. This is not a determination that Iran or any state can make on its own accord. The United States remains committed to achieving lasting peace and security in the region, including and especially for the people of Iran. Thank you, Chair. Now I call on delegations for the rights of reply at the end of the day today. I call on the representative of the Russian Federation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Russian Federation has already explained many times the origin of the Ukrainian crisis. We'd like to recall that those countries that are complaining about the Russian Federation in the context of the Ukrainian conflict for many years blocked our efforts to find a political and diplomatic solution that would have allowed for ensuring the security equally of Russia and of Ukraine. The European countries were consistent in their sabotage of the agreements reached in February 2014 and the Minsk agreements. Adopted by the Security Council and the Istanbul negotiations that could have ended the conflict back in 2022. For many years, we've seen flat unwillingness to set aside an escalation of the conflict and to consider Russia's legitimate national security interests. Instead of that, Brussels is ramping up the delivery of weapons to the Kiev regime. This is only worsening the situation. Russia is not refusing and not evading negotiations of direct contacts with the Ukrainian side. We're prepared to continue dialogue so as to ensure a comprehensive long-term settlement, a settlement that would address the root causes of the crisis. There's another thing that's absolutely unacceptable for us. It's what we've heard in this section of the first committee. I'm referring to attempts to tarnish Russia's peacekeeping efforts in Transnistria. The Moldovan public statements we've heard are completely unglued from reality. Statements calling for the withdrawal of Russian soldiers from Transnistria. The presence of peacekeepers is the only real factor that guarantees peace and calm in the region. We're concerned by the fact that Moldovans are no longer talking about OSCE documents about granting Transnistria a special status. Ukraine took the same path in pretending to implement the Minsk Agreements. Any non-diplomatic ways of resolving the situation that jeopardized the security of our soldiers are attempts that we will view as an attempt to as an attack on the Russian Federation. We have a cape for normalizing dialogue among the parties, and we want to see uh agreements reached previously observed. We trust that Moldova will be constructive and respond to the uh calls of Taraspel to sit at the negotiating table. The end goal should be developing with international mediation a formula for a viable, comprehensive settlement. Chairman We've heard statements by Georgia too, given them. We need to clarify the state of affairs around South Assetia and Abkhazia. These are independent states recognized by Russia in a number of countries based on a free vote held by the South Ossetian and Abchazian peoples. That expression of uh will was fully in line with the norms and principles of international law, including the Charter. And that concludes the matter for us. A real contribution to stability and security in the region would be a legally binding agreement on the non-use of force between Georgia on the one hand and Abkhazia and South Assetia on the other hand, as well as the process of delimiting the state borders and later demarcating them. And finally, I want to underscore the absolutely legitimate nature of Russia's cooperation with all of its partners and allies. That includes Belarus, Iran, and the DPRK. We would ask the Western delegations to stop their much favored practice of meddling in the sovereign affairs of our state. All of our actions are aimed at ensuring national, regional, and international security. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chair, uh, Ukraine wishes to exercise its right to reply in response to the statement delivered by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran on behalf of a group of states. We welcome the fact that the issue of prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities has been raised and that such attacks are claimed to be unacceptable. For Ukraine, this issue is a matter of immediate and profound concern. Yet there is a striking contradiction between the principles proclaimed in today's statement and the actions of one of its authors, the Russian Federation. Indeed, Russia has considerable practical experience in precisely the activities it now seeks to condemn. On 24 february 2022, the very day Russia launched its full scale invasion of Ukraine, its armed forces occupied the Chernobyl nuclear power plant site. The occupation continued until 31 march 2022. Less than two weeks later, on 4 March 2022, the international community witnessed Russian troops carrying out a direct military assault against the Zaporizh nuclear power plant. During the military action against Zaporizhia nuclear power plant, the plant's premises came under fire, several buildings were hit, the training center sustained substantial damage, a fire erupted, and other infrastructure and equipment were affected. Russian forces subsequently established control over Europe's largest nuclear power plant. This was not merely a warning, a threat, or a hypothetical risk. It was an actual armed attack on civilian nuclear installation, followed by its forcible seizure and continued occupation. Mr. Chair, Russia's actions against Ukraine's nuclear infrastructure did not stop there. On 14 February 2025, a Russian drone struck the new safe confinement at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant, a protective structure constructed through international efforts to contain the consequences of one of the most devastating nuclear disasters in history. The attack triggered a fire and inflicted significant damage on the facility. More recently, on 7 june 2026, another Russian drone strike targeted Ukraine's civilian nuclear infrastructure, this time the centralized spanned nuclear fuel storage facility. The attack partially destroyed the container reception building and damaged nearby structures, including facilities used by IAA personnel. So, for one of the authors of today's statement, attacks against nuclear facilities are not an abstract legal concept. Nor is the military seizure of nuclear facilities a theoretical scenario. Few delegations in this room can claim such extensive first hand experience with the subject of attacks and seizure of nuclear facilities. Ukraine therefore takes note of the Russian Federation's newly expressed condemnation of attacks and threats of attack against nuclear facilities. We hope that this evolution in rhetoric will soon be followed by an evolution in conduct. Nuclear facilities must not be attacked, they must also not be seized by military force. They must not be occupied, they might not be militarized, and they must not be used to support military operations. If the Russian Federation genuinely wishes to demonstrate its declared commitment, it doesn't need another joint statement to do so. It can start with withdrawal from the nuclear power plant. It attacked, ceased, and continues to occupy, namely the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chair. Once again, Iran has chosen to exploit this distinguished form to distort the facts. evade responsibility, and portray itself as a victim of the very threat it continues to generate. Iran's claims regarding the alleged peaceful nature of its nuclear program cannot be reconciled with its long standing record of concealment, noncompliance, and obstruction of international scrutiny. These are not allegations. They are fine it's documented by the IAEA itself. Mr. Chair, Iran's nuclear program extends far beyond the peaceful threshold in pursuit of military nuclear capabilities. At Natanz and Fordo, Iran enriched uranium to 60%, a level far beyond the requirements of conventional civilian nuclear power plant power generation. In Isfahan, Iran operated uranium conversion and fuel fabrication facilities. While in Iraq, it pursued a heavy water reactor designed for weapons grade plutonium. That clearly violated its obligations. Iran's history of undeclared nuclear material and activities further undermines its claims of exclusively peaceful intentions. In June 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors formally found Iran's being in non compliance with its safeguards obligations, a finding reiterated recently in June 2026. Iran has repeatedly failed to meet its obligation to the IAEA. Withholding essential information and obstructing international verification. According to the Directors General's September 2026 report, during the reporting period, the agency received no information regarding the safeguard status of Iran's 22 declared nuclear facilities and one location at such facilities, nor was it granted access to conduct verification activities. The implications are grave. According to the IEA, Iran's estimated stockpile of last year included 400. 40.9 kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60%. More than a year later, the agency has lost continuity of knowledge regarding the material and cannot determine the current size, composition, or whereabouts of Iran enriched uranium stockpile. Despite the IEA repeated attempts and requests for inspections, Iran has been determined to obstruct and evade international security. Ultimately, the IAEA has explicitly identified the situation as a serious proliferation concern, requiring urgent resolution. It cannot verify that the nuclear material has not been diverted into military purposes, nor provide assurance that Iran's program is exclusively peaceful. Peaceful intentions are demonstrated through transparency and compliance, not exploitation of this form. Evidence of Iran's rough conduct is reflected in the restoration of UN Security Council's sanctions. The international community's response through the UN frameworks to Iran's significant non-performance of its commitments under the JCPOA under Security Council Resolution 2231. Mr. Chair, it's equally troubling that certain Member States continue to lend diplomatic legitimacy to Iran's misleading narratives. Those who defend or excuse Tehran's conduct should consider the message they are sending. That repeated noncompliance, obstruction of international inspectors, and the threat to civilian populations can be overlooked for political convenience. This committee must not allow distortions to replace established facts. Israel calls upon the international community to insist on Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA and compliance with its binding international obligations. Ultimately, action speaks louder than words, and Iran's actions speak for themselves. I thank you, Chair.
Chair, Finland exercises its right of reply in response to the statement made by the Russian Federation. Finland firmly rejects the Russian Federation's attempt to portray Finland's and Sweden's NATO membership and NATO's defensive activities as threats to its security or as justification for its withdrawal from the CFE treaty. Russia ceased implementing the treaty already in 2007, long before Finland and Sweden joined NATO. Russia has cause and effect backwards. It was Russia's illegal war of aggression against Ukraine and its attempts to dictate the security choices of its neighbors that fundamentally changed Europe's security environment. Finland's decision to join NATO was sovereign, democratic, and based on a thorough assessment of the chain's security environment with strong public support. NATO's strengthened deterrence and defense are a response to Russia's actions, not a threat to Russia. Finland and Sweden exercise their sovereign right to join a defensive alliance. Our membership is not directed against anyone. Russia cannot shift responsibility for its own actions onto those responding to them. I thank you.
Thank you, Chair. Sweden exercises its right of reply in response to the statement made by the Russian Federation. We reject the assertion that the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO altered any security in Europe. Sweden's decision to reorient its foreign and security policy was taken in response to the fundamentally changed security environment following Russia's full scale invasion of Ukraine. Let me underscore the sequence of events. It was only after Russia's aggression against Ukraine that Sweden concluded it was necessary to end more than 200 years of military non-alignment and seek NATO membership. Sweden's decision to join NATO was a sovereign one. If Russia considers such sovereign choices to be problematic, it should be well advised to reflect on the consequences of using military force to pursue political objectives. It should also be placed on record that NATO is a defensive alliance. The accession of new members for the purpose of collective defense does not threaten Russia or any other country. Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Chair. My delegation had not intended to take the floor today, but the DPRK delegation's repeated and groundless allegations has left us with little choice but to exercise our right of reply. First, the DPRK is consistently misleading the situation. The ROK US combined defense and deterrence posture is a response to the DPRK's ever growing. Military threats, not the other way around. The DPRK has continued to develop its unlawful nuclear and ballistic missile programs in violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. In this situation, as our security is threatened, the RK is maintaining the RK US combined defense and deterrence posture, including the conduct of combined trainings exercise. This posture constitutes a legitimate and defensive response to protect the lives and safety of our people. And to contribute to regional peace and security. Second, on the role that DPRK claims for regional peace and security. Peace is not built through repeated nuclear tests, through missile launches that violate council resolutions, or through military cooperation that does the same. The DPRK can contribute to peace and security of this region in one way. by complying with its obligations and abandoning its nuclear weapons and program. Further once again, we we would like to emphasize that we need to resolve the Korea Peninsula issue comprehensively through dialogue. Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me the floor. The DPRK delegation is compelled to take the floor in response. To the provocative allegations from some delegations who took the floor this afternoon. First, to the representative of the United States. It is the US who has first introduced the nuclear weapon into the Korean Peninsula in the 1950s and still continues the nuclear threat against the DPRK, putting the DPRK on its list of preemptive nuclear attacks. It is also the US who has evolved its regional military bloc into a nuke based one. Staging large military exercises in and around the Korean Peninsula, targeting the DPRK, allowing ROK to access to U.S. nuclear weapons under the pretext of Washington Declaration and Nuclear Consultative Group, while deploying ultramodern military assets such as F 35 steps fighters and intermediate range missiles. It is highly legal and as a matter of course for the DPRK to respond reflectively. To the nuclear threat of the US to safeguard its national security interests. The DPRK will remain committed to its mission to fully guarantee the security and the well-being of its people and its sovereign right. And to the delegate of the ROK. The DPRK has no intention and no reason to do anything with ROK. Nevertheless, ROK is staging anti DPRK nuclear war drills with the US every year, blatantly talking about the countermeasures against the DPRK. What countermeasures are they talking about against a nuclear weapon state? Developing their indigenous nukes or attacking DPRK with US nuclear weapons? Even last August, the ROK launched large military exercises with US, another undisguised nuclear war rehearsal aimed at getting familiar with the procedures and mode for attacking DPRK with nuclear weapons, according to the nuclear operation guidelines. It is not the DPRK but ROK who is provocative. DPRK delegation strongly recommends ROK to find ways and means to ensure its own security rather than provoking us. My delegation also rejects those groundless claims made by Estonia and EU delegate on the legal cooperation between DPRK and Russian Federation. DPRK armed forces have participated in the Kursk liberation operation and It has been just and falls into the jurisdiction of our own of our sovereign rights. It also completely meets the words and spirits of the Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between DPRK and Russian Federation, as well as international laws, including the UN Charter. DPRK and Russian Federation has been standing on the side of justice and will in the future represent the aspiration and demand of the world community for equality and justice and against the supremacy by means of resolute struggle. Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to respond to the latest attempts by the delegation of Ukraine to distort the situation around the Russian Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. It was specifically the Kiev regime that it's continued to deliberately create a threat of a serious nuclear incident in this plant. Just recently, on the 4th of October, the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Attacked the laboratory of block two of the station, which is in direct proximity, just two hundred meters away from the energy block of the uh plant. Kiev also carried out shelling of a waste uh r radioactive waste uh uh processing area. An attack on this plant could damage equipment. The proper functioning of which is necessary in order to uh handle radioactive waste properly. Ukraine has continued to strike the plant and the related infrastructure. Its aim is to hamper the operation of the plant and create the risk of a nuclear uh incident. This balancing on the uh brink of a nuclear disaster is showing the terrorist nature of the Kiev regime. This has become possible because there's been no reaction to such acts from the Western countries. There are many attacks and provocations, and they and they've continued to provide them with weapons, such attacks that the Ukrainian military is making. uh show that they don't care about nuclear f f s safety and security at various um uh international for fora like at the IAEA and the UN and they're able to and it's showing that they're they want to achieve their goals using any terrorist methods. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair. We have heard some delegations' remarks regarding nuclear disarmament and the Middle East. I would like to make it clear, Israel will not participate in processes that bypass established UN practices, are ill motivated, and are detached from the current reality in the Middle East. It is regrettable that these delegations continue to overlook the real destabilizer of the Middle East, Iran. We have already addressed this at length, so we will not take more of this committee's time. We call on these delegations to update their policy statement and devote more time and effort to pursuing a Middle East where all countries recognize each other's right to exist. I thank you, Chair.
Uh Chair, the delegation of Ukraine is compelled to exercise again its right of reply. In response to the statement just made by the delegation of the Russian Federation, Ukraine has repeatedly raised the issue of nuclear safety and security, including earlier today during the General Assembly's consideration of the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency, when where the Russian Federation once again demonstrated its disregard for nuclear safety and security by vo voting against the relevant resolution. The Russian delegation has once again attempted to turn reality upside down. Portraying the aggressor as a victim and Ukraine, which is defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity as the source of threats to nuclear safety. Let us recall one simple fact. Before Russia's full scale invasion, the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant was operating under Ukraine's sovereign control. There were no Russian troops on its premises, no military equipment deployed there, and no risks arising from its military occupation. All these dangers emerged as a result as a direct consequence of Russia's aggression and its subsequent seizure of this facility. Russia cannot create a grave threat to nuclear safety and security, perpetuate its through its illegal military occupation, and then seek to blame Ukraine for the consequences of its own actions. The solution is neither complicated nor controversial. Russia must withdraw its forces, return the plan to Ukraine's full control, and end its war of aggression against Ukraine. Thank you. The following delegations are unable to exercise their rights of reply due to time constraints. They will be heard the delegation of Iran. They will be heard as the first speakers to exercise their right of reply at our next meeting. Distinguished delegates, we have exhausted the time available for this meeting. The committee will reconvene next Monday, 26 October, at 10 a.m. in Conference Room 4, when we will continue our thematic discussion. On the Regional Disarmament and Disarmament Machinery. At 5 30 next Monday, the Committee will hold its award ceremony for the 2026 United Nations Disarmament Fellowship certificates. Should the committee conclude its consideration of the cluster on disarmament machinery early on Monday and taking into consideration rights of reply and the award ceremony? We will begin the third and final phase of its work, namely action on all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items, where we will hear general statements and explanation of vote before the vote on proposals submitted under Cluster 1 nuclear weapons. Let me be clear no voting will take place next Monday, only statements. In this regard, the committee will begin will be guided by the informal papers issued by the Secretariat containing the draft resolutions and decisions which action will be taken each day. The meeting is adjourned.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.